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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Richard Pena appeals asserting that the district court erred by admitting, over his
objection, propensity evidence of his prior encounters with police because that evidence
was not relevant to any non-propensity purpose that was actually at issue in this case.
Furthermore, the prejudicial impact of that evidence substantially outweighed its minimal
probative value. Therefore, this Court should vacate the judgment of conviction in this
case and remand for further proceedings.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
When an acquaintance asked Mr. Pena to give her and her friend a ride home
from a bar one night because he had not been drinking, Mr. Pena did so. (Tr., p.386,
Ls.1-11.)1 The acquaintance’s friend lived in an area with which Mr. Pena was not
familiar. (Tr., p.511, Ls.17-19.) As a result, he only signaled for a short period before
turning into the trailer park where the friend lived.

(See Tr., p.511, Ls.19-21.)

Unfortunately for Mr. Pena, an officer following him initiated a traffic stop based on an
improper signal. (See Tr., p.183, L.11 - p.184, L.15.)
Mr. Pena provided the officer with his license and registration.
Ls.9-12.)

(Tr., p.186,

When the officer ran that information through dispatch, he confirmed

Mr. Pena was the lawful owner of the car. (Tr., p.188, L.24 - p.189, L.1; see Exhibits,

The transcripts of this case were provided in three independently bound and paginated
volumes. The first two are designated as “Vol.1” and “Vol.2.” The third, containing the
transcripts of the trial testimony, does not have an independent volume identification
number. Unless otherwise indicated by the applicable volume number, citations to “Tr.”
are to the volume containing the transcripts of the trial testimony.
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p.2 (the registration for the vehicle).)2 However, the officer also learned Mr. Pena’s
license was suspended and there was a warrant for his arrest. (Tr., p.190, Ls.10-13;
Tr., p.190, L.24 - p.191, L.1.) As a result, he placed Mr. Pena under arrest and took him
from the scene. (See Tr., p.199, Ls.6-15.)
Based on the officers’ observations of Mr. Pena behavior during the traffic stop,
Mr. Pena was evaluated at the jail to determine whether he had been driving under the
influence. (See, e.g., Tr., p.197, L.12 - p.198, L.7.) The officer who conducted that
evaluation believed Mr. Pena was under the influence of a stimulant, but did not testify
as to what type of stimulant he suspected Mr. Pena of ingesting. (See Tr., p.267,
Ls.9-13.)

A subsequent analysis of Mr. Pena’s blood revealed methamphetamine.

(Tr., p.301, L.20 - p.302, L.10.) However, Mr. Pena testified that he had used several
days before and was not feeling the effects of that use. (Tr., p.524, Ls.4-8.)
Meanwhile, two other officers conducted an inventory search of Mr. Pena’s car in
preparation for towing it. (See, e.g., Tr., p.310, L.24 - p.311, L.10.) During that search,
they found a gun under the driver’s seat. (Tr., p.312, L.6 - p.313, L.12.) One of the
officers also found a soap dish in front of the center console. (Tr., p.316, Ls.18-25.)
When he opened that container, he found additional ammunition. (Tr., p.318, Ls.8-9;
Tr., p.316, L.24 - p.317, L.3.) Finally, they found various vials and syringes in the center
console and the back of the car. (Tr., p.318, L.20 - p.319, L.5; Tr., p.322, Ls.12-16.)
Mr. Pena ultimately admitted that those vials and syringes were his for use of
testosterone and methamphetamine. (Tr., p.533, Ls.12-19.)

Copies of the documents and pictures admitted as exhibits at trial are provided in a
separate PDF document from the rest of the Clerk’s Record. References to that
document will be designated “Exhibits” and will use the PDF page number.
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Forensic examination of the gun and the soap dish revealed three fingerprints
that could be evaluated for identification purposes. (Tr., p.454, Ls.3-7.) Two were
found on the soap dish. (Tr., p.454, Ls.13-16.) The third was found on an interior layer
of tape covering the handle of the gun. (Tr., p.454, Ls.22-23.) Subsequent evaluation
of those prints revealed that none of them came from Mr. Pena. (Tr., p.460, L.18 p.461, L.9; Tr., p.474, Ls.23-24.)
Mr. Pena testified that, while the car was his and he used it often, he also
regularly leant it to friends to use. (Tr., p.527, Ls.14-19; Tr., p.528, Ls.14-15.) He also
testified that he did not know the gun was in his car. (Tr., p.534, Ls.8-13)
Nevertheless, Mr. Pena was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm,
misdemeanor driving under the influence (hereinafter, DUI), driving without privileges,
possession of drug paraphernalia, and misdemeanor possession of the testosterone, a
schedule III narcotic. (R., pp.29-31.) The State subsequently filed an Information part
II, alleging Mr. Pena to be a persistent violator. (R., pp.64-66.)
Prior to trial, the prosecutor filed a notice of intent to present evidence about
Mr. Pena’s prior convictions in relation to the unlawful possession of a firearm charge.
(R., pp.51-52.) The district court ultimately ruled that, if Mr. Pena made a sufficient
stipulation that he had been convicted of a felony which would bring him under the
unlawful possession statute, evidence of the nature of that felony would be
inadmissible. (Tr., p.12, Ls.6-9.) Mr. Pena made a sufficient stipulation. (Tr., p.19,
Ls.22-25.) As a result, the jurors were simply instructed that Mr. Pena had stipulated he
had been convicted of a qualifying felony, and they were not to speculate as to the
nature of that felony. (Tr., p.379, Ls.6-17; R., p.171.)
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However, there was a related aspect of that issue which remained unresolved
heading into the trial – whether the State could present an audio recording from the stop
wherein Mr. Pena had expressed his desire to not have the officers search his car
because they had done so on several prior occasions. (See, e.g., Tr., p.164, Ls.6-8.)
The district court ultimately determined the audio would be inadmissible because
Mr. Pena had invoked his Fourth Amendment rights during that conversation, and the
only remaining question was whether there would be a limitation on that ruling, whether
the audio “can be used if it is relevant to another purpose.” (Tr., p.376, Ls.12-18.) The
district court determined that, “unless the defendant does something to open the door
by denying ownership or control of the car itself,” there audio recording would remain
inadmissible. (Tr., p.377, Ls.15-18.)
But, in discussing that issue, another related issue came up: the prosecutor
anticipated that some of the officers would testify that they had seen Mr. Pena driving
this same car on several prior occasions, though she did not anticipate them getting into
any more detail than that. (Tr., p.171, Ls.2-25.) Defense counsel objected, asserting
that was improper propensity evidence.

(Tr., p.164, Ls.18-20, p.171, Ls.17-18.)

Defense counsel explained that “we’re not disagreeing this is his car and that he drives
it, so I don’t see how that [proposed testimony] is a rebuttal to -- an assertion that he
also loans it out.” (Tr., p.171, Ls.14-17.) The district court decided the officers could
testify as to those previous encounters with Mr. Pena in the limited fashion described by
the prosecutor because the district court concluded, “it’s evidence of not only his
ownership, which may not be in dispute, but his use of the vehicle, and therefore, his
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potential control of anything in the vehicle. Sounds like if it’s a month or so before, it’s
close enough in time to make it relevant.” (Tr., p.172, Ls.12-17.)
As a result, during the prosecutor’s case-in-chief, Officer Miller testified that he
had seen Mr. Pena driving that vehicle approximately three times in the six to eight
months preceding the stop in this case. (Tr., p.347, Ls.4-10.) Similarly, Officer Muguira
testified that he had seen Mr. Pena driving that vehicle three times in the two and onehalf to three months preceding the stop in this case. (Tr., p.307, Ls.8-16.)
The jury ultimately convicted Mr. Pena of unlawful possession of a firearm,
driving without privileges,3 possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of a
controlled substance.

(R., pp.190-91.)

misdemeanor DUI charge.

(R., p.190.)

However, it acquitted Mr. Pena on the
After that verdict was entered, Mr. Pena

admitted the allegations in the Information part II. (Tr., Vol.1, p.52, L.11 - p.56, L.4.)
The district court subsequently sentenced Mr. Pena to a unified term of twenty
years, with seven years fixed (five years fixed, zero indeterminate for unlawful
possession of a firearm and a consecutive term of two years fixed, thirteen years
indeterminate, on the persistent violator enhancement), with concurrent sentences for
the misdemeanor convictions. (Tr., Vol.1, p.72, Ls.3-16; R., pp.195-96.) Mr. Pena filed
a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.202-04.)

Mr. Pena had admitted during his testimony that he knew his license was suspended.
(Tr., p.512, Ls.9-14.)
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ISSUE
Whether the district court erred by determining the evidence of Mr. Pena’s prior
encounters with police was admissible propensity evidence.
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Determining The Evidence Of Mr. Pena’s Prior Encounters
With Police Was Admissible Propensity Evidence
A.

Standard Of Review
When reviewing the admission of evidence of prior conduct under this rule, the

courts apply a two-part test: “(1) whether, under I.R.E. 404(b), the evidence is relevant
as a matter of law to an issue other than the defendant’s character or criminal
propensity; and (2) whether, under I.R.E. 403, the district court abused its discretion in
finding the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant.”

State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 8 (2013)

(internal quotation omitted). The questions of law are reviewed de novo. Id. at 6. The
questions of discretion are reviewed under the three-step inquiry from State v. Hedger,
115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989). Joy, 155 Idaho at 6.
B.

The Testimony About The Officers’ Prior Encounters With Mr. Pena Was Not
Relevant To A Non-Propensity Purpose That Was Actually At Issue In This Case
For evidence of prior conduct to be relevant to a non-propensity purpose, the

past and presently-charged events “must be linked by common characteristics that go
beyond merely showing a criminal propensity and instead, must objectively tend to
establish that the same person committed all the acts.” State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho
664, 668 (2010).

Put another way, “[e]vidence of uncharged misconduct must be

relevant to a material and disputed issue concerning the crime charged, other than
propensity.” State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52 (2009). In this case, the officers’ testimony
about having previously encountered Mr. Pena while he was driving this same vehicle
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was not relevant to a material and disputed issue, and therefore, only constituted
propensity evidence. Compare State v. Naranjo, 152 Idaho 134, 138 (Ct. App. 2011)
(finding that testimony from a confidential informant about previous instances when he
bought drugs from the defendant was not relevant to a material and disputed issue
about the sale for which the defendant was charged, thus holding it was improper
propensity evidence); cf. United States v. Scott, 677 F.3d 72, 78-79 (2nd Cir. 2012)
(applying a similar rule to a factual scenario similar to this case and finding that
evidence was improper propensity evidence).
The district court decided the propensity evidence in this case was relevant to
show that Mr. Pena owned and used the vehicle, and thus, was more likely to have
known about, and so, possessed, the items therein. (Tr., p.172, Ls.12-17.) However,
as defense counsel pointed out, the defense was not disputing the fact that Mr. Pena
owned and used that vehicle.

(Tr., p.171, Ls.14-16.)

In fact, the district court

recognized that Mr. Pena had not put his ownership or use of the car at issue in this
case, as it held the audio recording, which also referenced these previous encounters
was inadmissible “unless the defendant does something to open the door by denying
ownership or control of the car itself.” (Tr., p.377, Ls.15-18; cf. Tr., p.172, Ls.14-15
(recognizing “his ownership [of the car], which may not be in dispute . . . . .”).) Since
that was not a disputed issue, that was not a valid non-propensity reason to allow the
prior acts testimony in. Grist, 147 Idaho at 52; cf. State v. Dragoman, 130 Idaho 537,
545 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding that officers’ testimony about prior, unrelated encounters
with the defendant were not relevant to a non-propensity purpose), superseded by
statute on other grounds.
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As both the Idaho Supreme Court and Court of Appeals have made clear, there
must be limits on the use of prior bad acts evidence; the exceptions are not to be given
expansive effect. Grist, 147 Idaho at 54 (quoting State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559 (2007),
and State v. Tolman, 121 Idaho 899 (1992), overruled in part by Grist).

Broadly

allowing propensity evidence, as the district court did in this case, would “virtually
eviscerate[]” the restrictions 404(b) establishes. State v. Cook, 144 Idaho 784, 788-89
(Ct. App. 2007).

Since the propensity evidence offered in this case – the officers’

testimony to seeing Mr. Pena driving this car in the months preceding the alleged
incident – was not relevant to a material and disputed non-propensity basis, it was
inadmissible under I.R.E. 404(b). Therefore, the district court’s order to the contrary is
erroneous and should be reversed.
C.

The Prejudice Presented By The Propensity Evidence Substantially Outweighed
Its Minimal Probative Value
Even if this Court determines the testimony about the officers seeing Mr. Pena

driving this car in the months preceding the alleged incident is relevant to a nonpropensity purpose, the prejudice presented by that testimony substantially outweighed
its minimal probative value, and so, it should still have been excluded. See Joy, 155
Idaho at 6.
For example, that evidence was minimally probative because there was sufficient
other, non-propensity evidence in the record which spoke to the point to which the
district court decided this testimony was relevant. The registration papers Mr. Pena
provided identified him as the owner of the car.

(Tr., p.186, Ls.9-12; Tr., p.188,

L.24 - p.189, L.1; see Exhibits, p.2.) The officer who pulled Mr. Pena over testified he
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had confirmed that fact. (Tr., p.188, L.24 - p.189, L.1.) Mr. Pena was driving the car
when it was pulled over, which demonstrates he uses the car. (Tr., p.187, L.23 - p.188,
L.5.) Finally, Mr. Pena testified that it was his car and he used it regularly. (Tr., p.527,
Ls.14-19; Tr., p.528, Ls.14-15.)

Therefore, the officers’ testimony about seeing

Mr. Pena drive this car, so as to establish Mr. Pena’s ownership and use of the car, was
wholly cumulative.

When evidence is merely cumulative, it is less likely to be

admissible because its probative value is compromised. See I.R.E. 403. Since this
evidence is cumulative, it has, at best, minimal probative value.
On the other hand, the risk of undue prejudice is high. Conveniently, the Second
Circuit has engaged in an in-depth evaluation of this question in regard to similar
testimony. See Scott, 677 F.3d at 84; cf. Dragoman, 130 Idaho at 545 (reaching a
similar conclusion to Scott on similar facts without going into as much explanation). “It
stretches credulity to think that a jury would assume that the defendant’s lengthy and
numerous contacts with the police were not, in some sense, related to his bad character
and criminal propensity, even if evidence of these contacts did not lead the same jury to
conclude that he had been previously arrested.
Scott, 677 F.3d at 84.

This is the essence of prejudice.”

“Jurors would have drawn from it the conclusion that [the

defendant] had previously had significant contact with the police. Moreover, they were
told that this contact helped the detectives identify what he was doing, thus implying
they knew what he was likely to be doing.” Id.
The Scott Court distinguished “other cases in which identity was actually in
dispute, [where] that prejudice might be outweighed by the evidence’s probative value,
and the evidence may be admissible.” Id. “But here, given that the only proper purpose
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for the testimony was an issue not in dispute, we have no trouble concluding that the
potential prejudice of this testimony outweighed any conceivable probative value.” Id.;
cf. Grist, 147 Idaho at 52 (also holding that propensity evidence needs to be relevant to
an issue in dispute).
Those same issues are evident in this case because of the efforts the district
court and the parties had taken to limit the discussion of Mr. Pena’s criminal history in
this case. The jurors were only informed that he had stipulated to the fact that he had
been convicted of a qualifying felony, and they were instructed they were not to
speculate as to the nature of it. (Tr., p.379, Ls.6-17; R., p.171.) The district court also
held that, while testimony could be given that officers found pictures of Mr. Pena in the
car, they could not testify as to the nature of those pictures – pictures from prison
(see R., p.51) – because of the prejudicial impact and limited probative value of that
information. (See Tr., Vol.2, p.36, Ls.8-17.) Based, in part, on similar reasons, the
district court excluded the audio recording which referenced Mr. Pena’s previous
encounters with law enforcement. (Tr., p.376, L.16 - p.377, L.18.) All these rulings
were designed to keep the information about Mr. Pena’s previous encounters with law
enforcement to a minimum in the trial because such information would have been
unduly prejudicial.
The district court’s decision to allow the officers to testify that they kept having
encounters with Mr. Pena leading up to the event at issue runs contrary to those efforts.
That evidence leads to the situation the Scott Court highlighted – it allows the jury to
draw the inference that the officers thought Mr. Pena was continuing to get into trouble,
and so, he must have been in trouble this time, or they were keeping an eye on him
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because they knew he was likely to be getting into trouble. Compare Scott, 677 F.3d at
84. Such inferences are at the heart of why such evidence is inadmissible.
Therefore, the district court erred in admitting that evidence in light of its overlyprejudicial and minimally-probative nature. That means, even if it were relevant to a
non-propensity purpose, this testimony should still have been excluded, and the district
court’s failure to do so constituted an abuse of its discretion.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Pena respectfully requests this Court vacate the judgment of conviction in
this case and remand the case for further proceedings.
DATED this 23rd day of February, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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